# CHAPTER 5
# THE AUSTRALIAN-ASIAN CONNECTION:
# FROM ALFRED DEAKIN TO JOHN HOWARD


*'Australia's future lay not just **in** Asia but **with** Asia'.*
– MacMahon Ball (1938) quoted in Rix (1985)


## Contextualizing Australia in Asia

Australia's admission into the inner sanctum of East Asian Summit in 2005 may have been a turning point in Australia's relationship with is regional neighbours. This goes to the heart of what I have termed the '*Australian-Asian Connection*', or as others have called it, the *Asian Engagement* or *Enmeshment*. Australia has indeed come a long way since the historian La Nauze dismissed Australia's proximity to Asia as something for the future (Walker 2003). As we ponder the significance of joining the East Asian Summit, many questions come to mind: does this signify a radical change in Australia's view of itself? Is this the answer or a clue to the critical question whether Australia sees itself as an 'Asian nation' with a firm link to an Asian regional hegemony, or that Australia now embraces more firmly a duality—i.e., as an 'Asian nation as well as a European nation' (Collins 1985: 391). If, indeed there has been a change in how we comprehend the Australian-Asian connection, what underlies this sudden embrace of an 'Asian future' by none other than John Howard who in the past was forthright in his criticism of the regional policies in the Hawke and Keating era? (Dalrymple 2003).

This becomes a perplexing query, particularly when one recalls that Howard's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer has stated that Australia had no wish to be part of a new regionalism in the manner of a 'cultural regionalism' as

portrayed by Mahathir and others. In rejecting this model of regionalism Downer identified a 'Practical Regionalism' as the preferred model for Australia. The difference between these different forms of regionalism was that one was built on 'commonalities of history, of mutual cultural identity', and the other strictly on the mutual benefits of cooperation in the pursuit of common objectives of countries drawn together on the pursuit of mutual objectives. In this context, does Australia's not just willingness, but even eagerness, to be a member of the East Asian Regional conclave signify a preparedness on the part of Australia to jettison its past and accommodate itself to the presumed cultural identity of this regional grouping as an expression of 'cultural regionalism'?

But, as we shall argue, a 'practical regionalism' is not possible without understanding and acknowledging how this plays out in the very 'unpractical' practices of Australian citizenship and identity. The critical question here is: how does Australia see itself as a nation after a hundred years since gaining its independence from being under the tutelage of its colonial masters? In short, how do we begin to comprehend the 'Australian-Asian' connection when looked at from the Australian point of view? We address this issue by focusing on the question of how Australia sees itself as a nation, its sense of nationhood vis-à-vis 'others', in particular  its immediate neighbours.[1] This, we shall argue, is intimately linked to the 'peopling of Australia' and the centrality of migration in the making of Australia as an independent nation, and perhaps more crucially, defining a sense of 'who is an Australian' (Goot and Watson 2010). There is no doubt that, immigration has been 'a constant theme in Australian since 1788 but has often been curiously overlooked or under-stressed by historians' (Jupp1986: 3).

Immigration, in particular anti-Asian immigration was as shown in Chapter 1, a dominant theme in the 'legendary decade' of the 1890s prior to Federation. This reached its high-water mark with the passage of the Immigration Restrictions (IR) Act 1901embodying the idea of a 'White Australia' at the time of Federation and the founding of the Commonwealth of

Australia (see Appendix B). Immigration as a policy of recruitment and settlement of new settlers has ever since been a determining factor in the unfolding of the 'Australian-Asian Connection' tied to an Australian sense of nationhood and national identity. The White Australia policy was a political measure of considerable significance that was primarily directed at preserving the 'inherited and cherished cultural and social homogeneity' (Levi 1958: 197) of Australia as a nation. This was also at the time of federation a dominant consideration in the formulation of defence and foreign policy and was symbolized by a 'Fortress Australia' as a corollary to the White Australia policy.

It was this mix of policies built around military and strategic security concerns and framed as a 'Forward Defence' policy which viewed Asia as the frontline for defending Australia (Crook 1970). This defence and external affairs policy strategy linked with the *White Australia policy* was regarded as one of 'the two ring-fences [the other being protection] behind which economic and social life was pursued' (Hancock 1945). Of these, immigration became the cardinal unifying principle of the fledgling nation, and 'the independent condition of every other policy' (Hancock 1945). The cumulative effect of this overarching mix of national policy was to inculcate a 'racial consciousness', as a defining factor in 'imagining Australia'.

Considering the foundational role of a 'White Australia' in the formation of nationhood, it has both created and defined over time the space between Australia and Asia. This has led to 'the celebrated tension between our history and geography' which is critical to understanding the contours of Australian foreign policy. But the burden of the argument presented here is that the dilemma of 'history and geography' is not merely played out in the foreign policy arena, but is central to the very constitution of Australia's sense of its identity. In other words, history and geography is not taken to be a set of terms where history represents Australia and geography signifies Asia. Instead it is seen as being part of the constitutive narrative of the Australian political community and pivotal to framing citizenship in Australia. Such an approach allows for an

understanding of current immigration policies, especially multiculturalism as an ideology of settlement, as being intrinsic—not external—to narratives about national identity.[2] It is for this reason more than anything else that makes it difficult to have a 'practical regionalism'.

After Federation and until the end of the Second World War, the legacy of Australia's origins—not just British, but also its European ancestry—has dominated all facets of the Australian landscape—political, economic and strategic. These 'forces of history', largely a consequence of Australia being an 'anglo fragment' society[3] (Hartz 1964), have fashioned much of existing international and domestic policies, not least those affecting Australia's relations with the countries of the Asian region. But, to understand the nature and significance of the impact of immigration on the Australian consciousness and imagination, we need first and foremost, to adopt a broad brush historical approach to Australian immigration policy—of recruitment and settlement—to understand the tensions and conflicts inherent in what originally was a blatantly racist policy strategy (Markus 2001; Jayasuriya 1999; Jupp 1998).

## White Australia and the Deakin Legacy

### Immigration and Federation

The changing character of the Australian-Asian connection is vividly portrayed by the transformation that has taken place from the days of Alfred Deakin—one of the founding fathers of the Federation and one of the main architects of a 'White Australia'—to that of John Howard, the architect of the making of a new Australian consciousness. This is the divide between a 'British Australia' and an 'Australian Australia'—a multicultural nation. The continuities and discontinuities of policy, thinking and vision between Deakin and Howard may well provide valuable insights into the complex dynamics of this evolving Australian-Asian connection. Above all, the legacy, nay ghosts, of a White Australia and British Australia, as a political narrative which continues to

haunt all aspect of Australian public life.

Immigration, and in particular, Asian immigration, entered the public domain as a critical public policy issue mainly as a result of the substantial inflow of Chinese immigrants who came in the mid-nineteenth century to work in the gold mines of Victoria and later New South Wales. This, as pointed out in Chapter 2, in the pre-federation era led to anti-Chinese immigration legislation in New South Wales and other colonies around the racial stereotypic categorisation of the 'Yellow Peril'. This soon became a generic label covering all non-European labour, such as Indian indentured labourers and also Melanesians *(Kanakas)* located mainly in the mining and sugar cane industries of Queensland (see Appendix B). The fear of economic competition from Asia was so great that racist doctrines of white supremacy became the rallying point for organised labour, and formed at this time one of the key objectives of the labour movement (McQueen 1986; Curthoys and Markus 1978).

Australian immigration policy was undoubtedly central to the politics of people building and 'the Chinese were the anvil on which the new young societies were strongly hammering out their national identity' (Price 1970: 260). The legitimacy of Australia's immigration policies was seen to depend on 'the validity and morality of the principle of nationalism' (Willard 1967: 206), i.e., of preserving a British Australian nationality. Here we see clearly how history and geography were internally constitutive of a sense of 'peoplehood'.

However, economic competition, as noted in Chapter 1, was not the only reason for the hostility expressed toward non-European immigrants—a point sadly omitted or minimised by recent revisionist historians, and others critical of the 'black armband' view of history. The Chinese were also—because of their racial differences—despised as being inferior, and viewed as a threat to social cohesion and unity. Anti-Chinese sentiment was clearly racist and fuelled by stories of illicit sexual relations, implying a threat to racial purity through miscegenation. This, in fact, accounts largely for the priority given to *racial and cultural homogeneity*, in the early formulations of the 'White Australia' policy.

The need for 'racial purity', derived largely from 19th century British racial ideology, also included Social Darwinist thinking which was seen as providing an acceptable rationale, or a rationalisation of a policy of racial exclusion. These early settlers, in subscribing to the ideology of Social Darwinism, were also driven by a sense of cultural separatism and cultural supremacy which was achieved with the adoption the IR Act in 1901, embodying the principle of racial exclusion.-The need for a uniform immigration policy in several British colonies prior to Federation clearly constituted one of the main building blocks of Federation in 1901.

Not surprisingly the legislation on racial exclusion, the IR Act 1901, which was the basis of the 'White Australia policy', became the core of an exclusionary model of citizenship on which many of the other pillars of the Australian settlement rested. In this way White Australia as a narrative of political identity was foundational to all other dimensions of the Australian settlement. The idea of a 'White Australia', representing a fear that Asians will destroy Australian national ideals, constituted the *invasion narrative*, which formed for the greater part of the 20th century, the 'absolute orthodoxy of national existence'. In short, the sense of 'being Australian' was cast in terms of the Asian—'Other'—and an Australian identity was cast as an independent 'Australian Briton', or, a member of *New Britannia* (McQueen 1986). This was clearly what was driving Deakin and others of the time of Federation in promoting a White Australia.

While this racial ideology, associated with White Australia, acquired emblematic significance in portraying national identity, it also represented a 'whitening' of Australia, and the erection of 'The Great White Wall' (Price 1974). This, in turn, created an 'anxious nation'[4] with a deep sense of national insecurity. This sense of unease arose from 'the Australian dilemma'—the irreconcilability of Australia's history and geography—a European white outpost awkwardly situated with hordes of 'aliens' on its doorstep—the proverbial 'yellow peril'. This legacy of a *White Australia* continues to be central and critical to understanding not just the Australian-Asian connection, but also the very framing of Australian citizenship (Jayasuriya 2003a).

### The Deakin Legacy and Australian Nationalism

During this early phase of the making of Australia, Alfred Deakin stands out as a pivotal figure and powerful leader who had a lasting impact on the formative years of Australian nationhood (Murdoch 1923; La Nauze 1965). Deakin was a man of ideas, and a middle class liberal intellectual of the late 19th century; a product of the British imperial/colonial tradition and someone who proudly wore on his sleeve the qualities of the British Enlightenment. But, like many others in English speaking countries, he was most profoundly influenced by the writings of Charles Henry Pearson,[5] in particular, his seminal text, *National life and Character; A Forecast* (1894). Pearson was a liberal European intellectual who, in emigrating from Britain to Australia in the late 19th century, 'surrendered much of this elitist, cosmopolitan, and individualist beliefs, and associated himself with the new movements and sensibilities appearing in the Australian culture' of the late 19th century (Meaney 1995).

Deakin, in seeking an intellectual and moral justification of the policies of racial exclusion which he championed as a leading political figure, leaned heavily on Pearson. Racial superiority was, according to Manning Clark (1985), a central theme of the early Commonwealth, and for Deakin and others at that time, this was intimately connected with the 'invasion narrative' which made Asia 'the spectre haunting the Australian imagination' (Meaney 1995: 175). This also instilled an abiding race patriotism which was largely in terms of the nascent Australian nationalism—the need to defend the white race and western values as the essence of a *British Australian* national consciousness.

Accordingly, 'national homogeneity', that is, the binding together of people who are of the same race or who inhabit the same country, was central to the idea of nationhood of Pearson and his contemporaries. For Deakin as an 'Imperial Federalist', 'national homogeneity' also meant safeguarding a 'white British Australia'. No wonder then that Deakin in defending White Australia leant heavily on the ideas of his friend and mentor, Pearson, by arguing that promoting a White Australia' was an 'instinct of self-preservation', and adding that

'it is nothing less than national manhood, the national character and the national future that are at stake' (Deakin quoted in Meaney 1995: 175).

This sense of Australian nationalism was built around the pride in the achievements of the pre-Federation colonial Australians.[6] In the broad classification of types of nationalism (Smith 1991), Australian nationalism was mainly constructed as an 'ethno-nationalism', where the nation is primarily conceived in terms of shared ethnicity and language (Pitty and Leach 2004). Yet, Deakin's sense of nationalism was firmly based on humane liberal and democratic values, and a tacit endorsement of the fundamental dignity of the human personality regardless of race and colour. At the same time it is clear that Deakin's nationalism also entailed a sense of 'civic identity,[7] as it relates to his strong commitment to a liberal political citizenship, of rights and obligations (Brett 2003). Deakin who greeted his fellow countrymen at Federation as 'citizens of the new born Commonwealth' was one who steadfastly argued for the first time in Australian history that 'the possession of a common political citizenship' was to be seen as a hallmark of being Australian.

But, as Chesterman and Galligan (2000) argue, the establishment of an Australian citizenship, though not spelt out in the 1901 Constitution, was at the heart of Australian politics at the time of Federation. Yet, this sense of citizenship was tinged with more than a whiff of illiberal politics. This pertains to what Louis Hartz (1964) refers to as the paradox of equality, viz., equality for the 'white' man but denied for the 'coloured', especially the Aboriginal peoples, It also underlined the fact that the polity was illiberal in that it excluded those who were denied membership on the grounds of 'race' or colour. And the crucial point here is the way in which a civic citizenship depends on a 'prior' exclusionary constitution of the members of the political community.

Nevertheless, Deakin surely remains an intriguing political figure difficult to label or type cast. For instance, in the realm of politics, he straddled protectionist thinking with state intervention as in the endorsement of Justice Higgins famous

Harvester judgment (Kelly 2001). Importantly, he stood out as an enlightened liberal democrat who was deeply committed to the ideas of a liberal political citizenship as a fundamental principle of the Australian polity. Above all, Deakin was a political pragmatist par excellence. If *Benthamite utilitarianism* was the uniquely Australian political ideology' (Collins 1985), Deakin was probably one of its first and most astute exponents.

Deakin's pragmatism, destined to be a key feature of Australian public policy, was clearly evident in how Deakin, as an avowed Imperialist Federalist, but an 'Australian Briton', handled criticisms of his policy of racial exclusion such as that from the Imperial government that a policy of exclusion on the grounds of race or colour, would be offensive to fellow British subjects of the Empire and other friendly powers, in particular Japan. Deakin's intervention on this issue may well have saved the Australian Government. This was by arguing for the use of the Dictation Test (the Natal solution requiring competence in a European language) as the instrument for administering the policy of 'racial exclusion', and thereby seeking a way of reconciling Australian ideals with imperial obligations. But, in Deakin the politician, we also see how history and geography are played out.

Ironically, despite references to the 'Yellow Peril', as a threat to 'Caucasian civilization creeds and politics', Deakin who had a particular fascination with India and Oriental mysticism wrote two books on the Indian sub continent: *The Irrigated India* (1893), and *Temple and the Tomb* (1893), after visiting India and Ceylon. This reveals Deakin's understanding of India cast in the mode of a British imperialist in the late 19th century. This scholarly work, as Walker (2003) notes, confirmed Deakin's reputation as a keen student both of Indian religions and the British Raj'. Deakin, as a pragmatist, considered that there could be 'considerable mutual benefit in closer trading links' with India, and was even 'prepared to make a case for the importation of Hindu workers, if "coloured" labour should prove indispensable to Northern development' (Walker 2003: 22) in Australia. If this was not just another instance of Deakin being a Benthamite utilitarian, not always constrained by

principles, then it was something which grew out of his long standing interest in theosophy.

There is no doubt that Deakin's spiritual quest which led him from 'Christianity to free thought, to spiritualism and theosophy' (Walker 1999: 23), always remained a potent influence on this thinking about life and society. This was clearly evident in his fascinating exploration of Indian religions in his book, *Temple and the Tomb*. Even by today's standards this reveals a sensitive and deep intellectual grasp of Buddhism; even a willingness to critique the institutional practices of Buddhism in countries such as India and Ceylon which he visited. Indeed, Deakin, the intellectual, led two different lives: that of mundane Victorian politics by day and an inner spiritual life, even as an 'esoteric Buddhist' by night.[8]

Deakin, as a moderate Liberal, was 'not consciously sectarian (Brett 2003: 43), and could not be seen as a militant Protestant. It is also unlikely he would have endorsed the popular view of the times that white superiority also meant the religious superiority of Christianity (Collin and Henry 1993). According to his friend and biographer, Walter Murdoch, Deakin's 'religious faith lay at the foundation of his being' (Murdoch 1923: 306). What Deakin detested was not religion itself, but 'priestcraft and dogma and intolerance' (Deakin 1880, quoted in Roe 1986: 34). It is, indeed, a moot point on how far being a 'Christian nation' was an element of his sense of Australian nationalism (Carey 2003).

Deakin was a truly 'remarkable figure in Australian politics', and an intellectual in politics, who while being a utilitarian pragmatist did not shy away from ideas. Certainly his religious dimension clearly shows that he was gifted with 'an enquiring mind, seeking to embrace truth where he found it' (Brett 2003: 42). He was a complex personality, as evident in the complementary and even competing political discourses that he was able to straddle. It would seem that the history and geography dilemma posed a personal dilemma for a political figure such as Deakin who often espoused contradictory and baffling viewpoints.

# A White Australia and the Growing Asian Consciousness

## The Practice of White Australia: From Deakin to Whitlam (1901-1971)

For over six decades the White Australia policy in principle and practice constituted one of of the three pillars of Australian capitalism, the other two being the *arbitration system* and *tariff protection* This formed the basis of the 'Australian settlement'—sometimes known as the 'Deakin Settlement'—which began to be dismantled only in the Hawke and Keating era (1983-1993) and completed under Howard. Likewise, Australia's defence policy and external relations, driven by a 'deeply ingrained' 'fear of Asia' (Millar 1978: 274), became symbolised as '*Fortress Australia*'. As argued earlier, this was firmly imprinted in the Australian psyche as a corollary to the White Australia policy.

During this early period of Australian Federation Japan certainly loomed large in the thinking of Australian leaders like W. M. Hughes—Prime Minister of Australia from 1915 to 1923—Hughes is remembered as the classic exponent of "White Australia' as a symbol of Australian national and racial consciousness. In his vigorous opposition to Japan's proposal that the League of Nations in 1919 should affirm the principle of equality in the Covenant, Australia reaffirmed the legacy of a White Australia by gaining acceptance at the League of Nations that the principle of equality did not necessarily confer the right of entry into Australia.

Likewise, the White Australia policy was extended to include Australia's mandated territories in the Pacific as part of *Forward Defence* and thereby denying any possibility of a Japanese encroachment. For Hughes there was no doubt that 'White Australia policy was the cornerstone of the national edifice' (quoted in Yarwood and Knowling 1982: 246).and in the 1930s, 'immigration policy was not just a frontier policy, a 'geographical policy of security', but one which contained an element of provocation' (Hancock 1945: 193). Given that these concerns were a logical corollary to the legacy of a 'White

Australia', it was imperative that Australia, having gained the status of an independent British dominion following Federation, should determine its own responsibility for national security.

The impact of post-WW II events, especially after the fall of Singapore, however, served to change dramatically the nature and character of Australia as an independent nation. Contrary to the exponents of a 'White Australia at the time of Federation' like William Lane (quoted in Walker 2003), who were driven by the fear that a resurgent China may one day unleash Genghis Khan's rampaging hordes, later day theorists argued forcefully for a policy of racial exclusion and a 'Fortress Australia'. However, this assumption was sharply disputed by intellectuals like McMahon Ball (1961) and Shann (1967) who, in the post-WW II era, argued that Australia could no longer rely solely on mother England for its defence and security, and need to reassert the view that 'Australia is a part of Asia' (Brown 1990).

Recognising that Australia could no longer be governed by considerations of its historic past, it was prompted to reconsider traditional approaches to defence and security. It was this reappraisal of policy options that led public bodies like the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) in 1950s to be more Asia oriented. These sentiments were also markedly evident in the expanding interest shown in promoting Asian Studies in the Australian Universities (Legge 1990) and also the desire to establish more direct links with Australia's regional neighbour. Many countries of the Region had themselves broken away from the shackles of colonialism and begun to assert their newly won independence. This shift towards Asia was clearly apparent when Australia became linked to the ANZUS Treaty and SEATO in 1951 and 1954 respectively (see Appendix B).

But while these questions of history and geography were played out in the competing narrative of national and political identity, the more critical questions of Australia's economic interests loomed large in the public agenda, and took priority over issues of defence and national security steeped in the invasion narrative and subsumed under the slogan 'populate or perish'. In the post-WW II era, there was no doubt that considerations of domestic policy bearing on Australia's rapidly

growing urban centred industrial economy had an important role to play in steering Australia's economic policy strategies which included a large-scale immigration program as a part of a conscious population policy (Collins 1975). As a result immigration policy, first in terms of changes to recruitment policies and later in the relation to the philosophy of settlement, was destined to have a profound impact on all facets of Australian society. And, as at Federation, the 'peopling' of Australia was becoming bound up with the politics of Australian identity and reaffirming the proverbial tension between history and geography.

This radical social and demographic transformation due to mass migration meant that Australia ceased to be primarily a British settlement with a distinct preference for British settlers (Appleyard 1971). The post 1945 demographic changes which showed a marked fall in the Australian and British-born component of the population created a strong impetus for a dramatic shift in traditional immigration settlement policy. Perhaps the most significant outcome relating to these new 'waves' of European migrants was that it challenged the orthodoxy of settlement philosophy which, as previously noted in Chapter 2, was strictly cast in terms of 'anglo-conformity'. This policy of hard-line assimilationism, i.e., one of total Anglo cultural conformity, was dubbed WASP because newcomers were expected to conform to the values of life styles of White Anglo Saxon Protestants (WASP). Interestingly, being Christian was never spelt out in the political rhetoric of assimilationism possibly because of the continuing historic *Protestant vs. Catholic* sectarian conflicts. The policy of 'total assimilation' was shown to be dysfunctional and for strategic reasons partially modified by a policy known as 'integration', and later by an entirely new policy of 'multiculturalism' or cultural pluralism (see Table A in Chapter 1).

In short, demographically, within a short period of four decades, the acceptance of new immigrants through several waves of migration—European and non European—radically changed the image of Australia as a society. While Australia is descriptively a multi-cultural society, and regarded as a culturally diverse plural society, it remains doubtful whether

there has been a corresponding normative shift i.e., as a constitutive principle of the nation, or a 'multicultural nation'. As we shall see, this normative multiculturalism has become the central problematic of the new political narrative of national identity promoted during the Howard era.

### Confronting Asia Post-Whitlam: Asian Migration and the New Economy

From the point of view of the Australian-Asian connection in the post-WW II period nothing was more significant than the growing opposition in the 1960s to race based immigration which resulted in the formal rescinding of the White Australia policy. Not only was there considerable pressure on governments to remove the moral taint of racism, but equally significant were other influences, domestic and external, which paved the way for the most significant liberalization of immigration entry requirements since 1901. The removal of the masthead of *The Bulletin*–'Australia for the White Man' by Donald Horne in 1960 was highly symbolic in that it testified concretely to the growing intellectual disenchantment with the racist ideology of the White Australia policy.

Considering that several critics of the ideology of a White Australia who insisted that 'homogeneity cannot be equated with whiteness' (Horne 1964: 125), some analysts, e.g., Viviani (1992), have argued that this final act of abolition, stamped a different image of Australia in the Asian region. This is only partially true, for it did not remove from the Australian consciousness, the folk psyche, a cardinal tenet of Australian immigration policies, viz., a latent idea of a predominantly homogeneous society and an implicit belief in a racial and culturally distinctive Anglo-Celtic society. The firm belief–despite evidence to the contrary that 'non Europeans are inassimilable'–continued to bedevil Australian society for nearly three decades (London 1970: 262; see also Jayasuriya and Kee 1999).

This new policy mix of profound changes to recruitment and settlement was in for a rough ride. The first indications of a backlash against a policy of non-discriminatory immigration, i.e.,

focused on recruitment, appeared with the fears generated by the intake of the 'boat people', the Vietnamese refugees in the late 1970s. This witnessed a reappearance of racism, reactivating the latent invasion fears of an earlier era, and served to confirm for at least the populous at large, the inherent fears of an 'anxious nation', only to be dampened down in political rhetoric. But, the first major and sustained controversy concerning Asian immigration did not occur till 1984 (Markus and Ricklefs 1985).

Here we see how competing stories of peoplehood came to have a dominant influence on Australian politics in the post-Whitlam era. The controversy was ignited by a leading Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey (1984) who objected to untenable levels of Asian migration, mostly on the grounds that these new settlers had created cultural ghettoes. These unassimilable new settlers were, it was suggested, a threat to social cohesion and national unity. Blainey, though appearing to critique levels of Asian migration, his hidden agenda, as I have argued elsewhere (Jayasuriya 1985) was an implicit, if not explicit, attack on multiculturalism as a policy strategy which threatens the core values of Australian society; indeed, of 'being Australian'. According to some commentators (Markus and Ricklefs 1985), this serves to highlight the strong nationalistic streak in Blainey's writings on Australian history and again points to the competing stories of peoplehood coming to the fore in the post-Whitlam era.

The general tenor of Blainey's onslaught on 'Asian immigration' was repeated more emphatically by John Howard in 1988 as the Opposition Leader Howard. He not only argued for a reduced intake of Asian immigrants, but also added an important corollary—the need to return to a 'One Australia' was another way of saying 'One Wollstonecraft', Howard's Sydney suburb (Henderson 1995a). Once again, we see that Blainey and Howard, in challenging immigration intake levels were using anti-Asian immigration as nothing but a code for 'anti-multiculturalism' These critics of immigration were more emphatic in attacking the historic shift in thinking about migrant settlement—multiculturalism—which had been consolidated in the Fraser era (1975-1983).

John Howard's 'One Nation' statement in 1988 was intended mainly as a rebuttal of multiculturalism in the Fraser Era (Maddox 2005). This was 'the basis of Howard's early opposition to multiculturalism', and reflecting his unwillingness to 'difference' (Henderson 1995b). In short, for Howard and many other Liberals, equality meant sameness. This clearly shows that Blainey and Howard were in general agreement that multiculturalism in theory and practice as a form of cultural pluralism was inimical to core liberal values such as equality, and also divisive, i.e., threatening the unity of Australian society and its cultural integrity.

These sentiments were again repeated more forcefully and effectively when the 'race' debate was reignited in 1996 by Pauline Hanson in her maiden speech in Parliament (Jayasuriya and Kee 1999). Hanson's contention that Australia was 'in danger of being swamped by Asians [who] have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate'. These new settlers, in short, were 'un-Australian', and had no idea of 'being Australian'. This backlash against immigration policies unleashed by Hanson received considerable popular support even among informed circles, and represented nothing more than a sentimental nostalgia for a forgotten past (Jayasuriya and Kee 1999). What defines Australia? It is the searching question that harks back to the more fundamental questions of history and geography which are so constitutive of the post-Federation period.

Concurrent with migrant policy changes favouring Asian migration domestic and external affairs loomed large in the public agenda and generated a new policy focus in the 1980s and 1990s. This new social, political, and economic perspective was predominantly concerned with matters pertaining to the economy, overseas aid,[9] defence, and foreign policy. First and foremost, the changing ethos of Australian immigration and uncertainty was about its long term implications, and intimately linked to the ongoing transformation of the Australian economy, and highlights the significance of the economic dimension of migration. The changes to the economy were in part driven by the new international division of labour whereby manufacturing industry was located in the Asia Pacific region.

The new economic imperatives arising from the structural changes to the economy, and the consequential social transformations of the post-WW II period were linked to the Asian Economic Miracle and the rapid rise of key Asian economies (the *Asian Tigers*–Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). This has radically altered the architecture of the global economy and somewhat ironically, after WW II, Japan, heavily dependent on the resource sector, replaced Britain as the Australia's leading trading partner.[10] As a result, despite the hiccup of the Asian economic crisis in 1997-98, the Australian economy was deeply enmeshed in the Asia Pacific region in a range of sectors–trade, education, resource commodities, tourism and investment. The stark reality was that there had been a marked shift of trade away from Europe to the Asia Pacific region. This new economic ethos has in recent decades continued to exert a powerful impact on all aspects of Australian social and political life–be it immigration, defence, or foreign policy.

Overall, from an Australian perspective it was clearly apparent that this new economic environment was increasingly dominated by questions of comparative advantage, which was primarily a question of the economic benefits gained through economic and trade relations with the countries of Asian region. In turn, fuelled by the strategy of 'comparative advantage', this has given a new impetus to the Australian-Asian connection on both fronts–domestic and external–and now popularly known as 'the Asian Engagement' or 'Enmeshment'. In this regard, the Garnaut Report (1989) was a path finding document, which made several recommendations to facilitate Australia's integration with the region, and refer largely to measures necessary to equip Australia to successfully engage with Asia in matters of trade, education, etc. In relation to Australian foreign policy, Garnaut observed that from the 1980s there has been 'a large shift towards emphasis on regional issues' rather than global interests.[11]

Despite having been the strongest exponent of the cardinal tenets of a White Australia until the late 1960s, the political credit for steering this 'Asian centredness' rests squarely with the Labor Party. On the domestic front, profound changes to migration policy–recruitment, and settlement–were again spearheaded by

Labor in the Whitlam era and subsequently endorsed by the more conservative Coalition parties, subject to some important changes, e.g., settlement policy. As Milner (1996) observes, it was in the Hawke and Keating era, that the foundations were laid for the economic integration and the adoption of a regional perspective in defence (the Dibb Report) and external affairs (the Harries Report).

Here again, while there has been a measure of bipartisan continuity of policy, there are some sharp differences of principle and practice in the 'spirit and tenor' of the policy implementation strategies (Cotton 2005). For instance, whereas the Howard era has proclaimed that its policies are purely in the 'national interest'—often a code for political interest—Hawke and Keating were more willing to explore and engage with abstract ideas and principles relating to the need to effect changes in the Anglo-Celtic mindset of Australia such as promoting Asian Studies and a greater 'Asian literacy'.[12]

But, 'neither political party embraces an affirmative answer to the question: Is Australia a part of Asia?' (Dalrymple 2003: 108). One of the main differences between Labor and the Liberal/ National Coalition Parties has been in the realm of external affairs, particularly as regards their respective policy perspectives, rationales and strategies. Thus, for example, despite the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, the unease about 'Asian Engagement' was perhaps evident in the difference in emphasis placed by the two main political parties on *regional* as opposed to *global* interests in fashioning Australian foreign policy (Cotton 2005). Labor, from the days of Whitlam, has been more prone to pursuing Asian centred and regionally oriented policies, such as those evident in increasing regional cooperation (e.g., APEC).[13]

This was particularly evident under the stewardship of progressive Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans who was decidedly more prone to promoting region-wide multilateralism, and actively sought a regional identity. The motif of defence and foreign policy during this time was that security 'lay in the 'region, not against the region, and identified mainly in terms of regional structures such as the ASEAN Regional Forum—ARF—a consultative body of major security players—Japan, China and

USA (Dalrymple 2003). In many ways this policy orientation harks back to the first flurry of internationalism in the post-WW II period chartered mainly by the late Dr Evatt, the veteran Labor leader and Foreign Minister in the Chifley government, who was also President of the UN General Assembly. Admittedly, Evatt's policy perspectives in this regard evolved against the background of the earlier initiatives such as the Colombo Plan (C Plan) in the Menzies era

The 'soft regionalism' promoted by the C Plan included an emphasis on cultural relations as well as a hidden 'cold war', and an anti-communism agenda (Lowe 2010). By contrast, the Coalition Parties in the Howard era, without excluding or denying the earlier regional initiatives, sought to give defence and external affairs policies a prominent place in its regionalism alongside a push towards bilateralism. This was spelt out in the 1997 and 2003 White Papers which clearly derided the earlier policy strategies stating that 'we do not have to choose between our history and our geography' (Cotton 2005).

Not surprisingly, Howard and Downer were inclined to place more emphasis on old alliances with Britain and the US (e.g., ANZUS), and more recently by explicitly pursuing an avowedly pro-US policy orientation. This was seen in the Asian region as 'the guarantor of the predominance of the Anglo-Celtic element in the population' (Dalrymple 2003: 216), which was apparent in Howard's willingness to play the role of 'regional policeman' – a sort of 'Deputy Sheriff'' for the United States. Australia was seen as a leading member of the 'Coalition of the Willing' in the Asia Pacific region, and this policy orientation came to be known as the 'Howard Doctrine. This policy strategy certainly contained a message to Australia's regional partners in Asia that she did not seek to be identified too closely with a regional grouping such as the one in the form of the EAEC or a 'cultural regionalism' as promoted by Mahathir. This approach to regional relations shifted somewhat after Howard's unexpected embrace of the East Asian Summit in 2005.

In whatever way one explains or rationalizes Howard's policy backflip, the more conventional and explicitly stated foreign policy orientation, i.e., of being in the 'national interests', as it has been

played out over a decade, clearly demonstrates a reaffirmation of the politics of people building (Smith 2001) as a legacy of a 'White Australia'. In the 'Coalition of the Willing' Australia remains identified to others as a 'White' Christian outpost with strong political and cultural links to Australia's western allies (UK and USA). This form of national image reflecting a cultural or *ethno-nationalism* sits more comfortably with Howard and Downer than the more cosmopolitan, global outlook and *civic republican nationalism* of the Hawke and Keating eras. What we have here, I suggest, are two competing stories of how in this political narrative Australian citizenship is to be framed, one defined in *civic* or *ethnic* terms.[14]

## The Australian Dilemma and National Identity

The foregoing brief overview highlights the different facets of the changing Australian-Asian connection manifest over one hundred years from Deakin to Howard. These changing perspectives,   as shown in Chapter 1, continue to be framed within the context of the *Australian dilemma* of history vs. geography. This we find vividly portrays Australia as a White, Christian, European nation being

> stuck like an anchored raft between the Indian and Pacific Oceans detached from the great land mass of ideas in the Northern Hemisphere and set apart from the great American Western Hemisphere. (Grant 1983: 20)

Central to grappling with this dilemma in the 21st century as Dalrymple (2003) and others argue is the uncertainty surrounding an Australian identity. In fact, Bill Hayden as Foreign Minister in the Hawke government observed perceptively that:

> Even Gough Whitlam, when he went to China in 1971 could not have envisioned the way the contact would force us to bite the bullet on the issues of our identity and our relationships in the Asian context. (1985: 7)

The question of how Australia is seen in Asia is clearly related to the way in which—wittingly or unwittingly—Australia is portrayed with a distinctive national stamp. This, no doubt lies fairly and

squarely in the realm of domestic politics, and is firmly entrenched in the long arm of history, particularly the events leading to Federation. The 'legendary decade' of the 1890s was deeply embroiled in debates about migration from Asia, and these were central to debates about Federation and creating an Australian identity. But these earlier narratives of political identity though greatly modified as a result of internal and external pressures, nevertheless continues to be revealed in political, social and cultural institutions and in the day to day social interactions.

Questions of identity are closely associated with the socio-demographic changes in Australian society that have taken place since WW II. This was first characterised by an 'Europeanization' of the population and later followed by a 'more radical cosmopolitanism with an influx of migrants from Asian countries' (Jones 2002: 110). However, the ongoing debate about immigration is no longer about intake policies, but about multiculturalism as the philosophy of settlement. The practice of multiculturalism for over three decades has thrown into sharp focus questions of Australian identity which indeed were problematic even before the advent of multiculturalism. Clearly what underpins the 'crisis of identity' rests fairly and squarely on the historic shifts in immigration policy, particularly the ideology of settlement as multiculturalism

The ideology of multiculturalism,[15] identified as 'cultural pluralism', has resulted in an 'identity politics'; and, as argued in Chapter 1, encountered the proverbial paradox of pluralism — the juxtaposition of cultural diversity, alongside the commonalities of a universal citizenship — which confronts the very difference it seeks to avoid or minimize, but also denies 'difference'. Unable to accept 'difference' and accommodate this paradox, opinion leaders and the wider public alarmed with the implications of this ideology of multiculturalism, viewed multiculturalism with considerable concern as positing a new constitutive principle of Australian society and nation, which seriously alters the traditional way of 'imagining Australia'. This was, as noted, primarily as an Anglo-Celtic nation—a White, European, Christian nation with a strong British inheritance.

The disturbing question posed by the critics of

multiculturalism, including Blainey, Howard, and Hanson, was whether a diverse and plural society—a mixed nation—was a threat to national unity and cohesion, especially to the traditional sense of an 'Australian identity', the Australian Australia' which had replaced a 'British Australia' of the Deakin era (Wilton and Bosworth 1984). The objections to multiculturalism heavily tinged with anti-Asian sentiments from Blainey to Hanson were couched in a language of public discourse markedly different from the discarded 'old racism' of the 19th century. This, in fact, importantly, denotes as shown in Chapter 2 a different type of racism— a 'new racism'— expressed predominantly in terms of the logic of differentiation and exclusion rather than on the discredited logic of inferiority/superiority based on biological racism (i.e., 'race' as being linked to biological differences). For 'new racism' it is the threat to the cultural integrity of the majority/dominant groups posed by newcomers of other cultures which is of prime concern

It is this link between national identity and exclusion which is central to 'new racism' which characterises Australian nationalism as been no longer a matter of white or racial superiority but one of 'cultural uniqueness'. The Hansonites' plea for 'cultural distinctiveness' was not directly linked to a cultural cringe associated with the Empire or the 'race patriotism' of the late 19th century, but to core cultural values. Once again, this sense of exclusion was markedly evident recently in the race riots in 2005 on Cronulla Beach. This was vividly expressed by the cryptic slogan presented as a conflict between those who 'flew here' and those who 'grew here'. In other words, the aliens, the culturally different, i.e., those who were seen not to subscribe to core *cultural* values, were regarded as not belonging—the excluded ones. What we find here is that 'the ideas of nation and nationality have provided the language which has allowed for a coded vicarious discussion of races' (Husband 1987: 321). This conflation of race, nation, and culture is highly reminiscent of the legacy of White Australia and canvassing a cultural homogeneity as a basis of unity.

This draws pointed attention to the fact that unravelling the 'Australian-Asian connection' means inescapably understanding how this is conceived in terms of a sense of citizenship framed

within the boundaries of the *political* nation (Jayasuriya 2004). This points to the fact that there are two main lines of thinking evident in the Australian multicultural discourse as regards the question of national identity and multiculturalism. One approach is in terms of affirming that national identity associated with the multicultural nation rests in the *political* nation. This was evident in the Fitzgerald Report (1988) labelled a 'Commitment to Australia', and also subsequently, the *National Agenda* policy document (1989). Accordingly Fitzgerald described multiculturalism as referring to the values derived from a liberal political culture such as equality, exercise of basic freedoms, mutual tolerance, rule of law, etc. This of course, endorses the democratic principles associated with a British inheritance of a political liberal culture. In short, democracy and equality were regarded as 'essential ingredients in developing a sense of Australian identity' (Jupp 1994: 9), and Keating proceeded to give his imprimatur to this as an acceptable definition of Australian multiculturalism by affirming that the basic principles of multiculturalism denote that:

> All Australians . . . accept the basic principles of Australian society . . . [which] include the Constitution and the rule of law, particularly democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language, equality of the sexes and tolerance. (Keating 2000: 262)

At the same time, Keating was emphatic in linking a sense of national identity and Australian patriotism to the multicultural banner by stating that 'the first loyalty of all who make Australia home must be *to* Australia' (Keating 2000: 262). This clearly envisaged replacing a sense of 'British Australia' with a specifically defined sense of an 'Australian Australia'.

The understanding of an Australian Australia', however, had produced very different and often conflicting answers (Meaney 1995). One dominant answer was in terms of the qualities and attributes of the *political nation* of political citizenship which Keating argued was distinctive of multiculturalism. Another was to strengthen this perspective of a normative multiculturalism by identifying what Australians hold in common as defining events of the national story, such as the Eureka Legend or the 'Bush Legend'.[16] In fact, Labor leaders like Dr Evatt and Whitlam have

shown a clear preference in listing the Eureka story[17] as 'a central legend of Australian nationalism . . . symbolic of democracy, freedom, republicanism and multiculturalism' (Duncan et al. 2002: 24-5).

The other dominant approach to characterizing national identity and multiculturalism is associated mainly with Howard who views the national character of a 'multicultural nation' as being embedded in the *cultural nation*, that is, terms of 'core cultural values'. Ironically, this prioritizing of 'culture' has turned on its head the very grounds on which multiculturalism was rejected by its critics, including Howard (Jayasuriya 2003; 2004). The need for a 'return to core Anglo-Celtic culture' which was also the essence of Pauline Hanson's *One* Nation's insistence on a historic pact was strongly endorsed by Howard when he embraced the 'm' word. This was on the explicit understanding of the implications of the 'm' word for national identity.

Howard argued forcibly that unlike other versions of multiculturalism, 'Australian multiculturalism' (as branded by Howard) was linked to 'a common culture . . . [or to] the symbols we hold dear as Australians and the beliefs that we have about what it is to be an Australian' (Howard 1997, quoted in Brett 2003: 195). But, the core values were never spelt out except vague references to the feelings and attitudes associated with 'the spirit of the people', the zeitgeist. In particular, this includes a reference to Gallipoli, and also to such qualities as mateship and fairgo.[18] These found expression in Howard's failed Preamble to the Constitution drafted by the likes of Blainey and Murray. This was the only explicit attempt made so far to portray a vision of a shared national identity cast in value terms as being fundamental to the preservation of unity and social cohesion.

The Australian values debate, in the context of the Australian-Asian connection, is also of special interest in that an Australian identity may have a bearing on whether, as some, like Evans and Keating suggest, Australia is not just an Anglophone outpost, but also a Christian nation. Marian Maddox in her path finding study on the place of religion in Australian politics in the Howard era, cites Linda Doherty in *The Herald*, who points out that ' "values" for Howard referred not to any religion but meant Christian

values' (Maddox 2005: 185) or at least a shorthand for 'religious values' (Maddox 2005). Further confirmation of this comes from Howard's failed appointment of a leading Anglican churchman—Archbishop Peter Hollingsworth as Governor -General, which impacted adversely on Australia being seen as a 'secular democracy'. This trend in some political quarters has to be viewed in the context of Australia's previously pragmatic stance about state and religion.[19] But with the growing concerns about Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of the religious right this may be severely tested in the foreseeable future.

It is also highly relevant and worth noting that Howard's espousal of core cultural values is remarkably similar to the appeal to 'Asian values' by Asian leaders like Mahathir. As Sen (2005) and others have noted, the championing of Asian values comes mainly from government spokesmen and regional elites of the Asian region. This is primarily intended to emphasize the distinctiveness of the Asians or cultural difference with 'Western values' (Thompson 2001; Dalrymple 2003). In this context, Sen makes the cautionary comment that the oft made claims that Enlightenment values such as freedom, liberty, and democratic principles, considered central to Western culture are alien to Asian culture, is untenable. There is mounting evidence from the history of ideas that these values are also found in other traditions such as Buddhism (Sen 2005; Omvedt 2001; Jayasuriya 2011).

Furthermore, insofar as the Asian values argument was part of the legitimising strategy of authoritarian Asian regimes (e.g., Singapore and Thailand), in Australia too Howard's 'the politics of reactionary modernization' (K. Jayasuriya 1998) was also fortified by resort to 'cultural values' to bolster popular support for Howard's social conservatism and new nationalism. Howard, with his policies of 'border security' and Tampa, cast the 'asylum seekers as a challenge to national identity' (Maddox 2005, 70), and inimical to the core values of Australian society. What is more, Howard repudiated the taunt of racism levelled at him by portraying the refugees as intimidating the Australian sense of decency!

This serves to confirm Howard's cultural or 'ethno' nationalism and reinforces the *Us vs. Them* nationalist ideology—

the 'them' being clearly defined by the 'outsiders', the marauding refugees, who were battering the Fortress. This nationalist streak is clearly visible in Howard's 1996 Campaign slogan: '*For All of Us*'. This was intended to appeal to 'us', that is, those with families considered themselves 'mainstream' and who thought that they had been neglected by the attention given to 'Them'—i.e., the Aboriginal people, Asian migrants, single mothers and other 'special interest' (Pitty and Leach 2004) —or 'others'. For Keating the philosophy of *Asian Engagement* on the other hand, though firmly grounded in the economics of neo liberalism, was framed in terms of an Australian citizenship and a civic republican nationalism. This stood in sharp contrast to Howard's 'ethno nationalism' which was overlaid by a cultural rhetoric and an Australian legend, going back to its British roots, including the monarchy. This shallow Anglo-Celtic sense of Australian consciousness promoted by Howard is steeped in the 'the Australian way' of the likes of Henry Parkes' *One Nation One Destiny*, and enshrines a national story built around icons such as ANZAS and Gallipoli.

One thing is clear: as long as the debate is about 'history and geography' it will be about 'who is an Australian?' The formal abandonment of White Australia and the multicultural discourse has not deterred us from 'imagining' Australia away from a 'White Australia (Ang 2003). The emerging Australian identity characterising being Australian demands an inclusionary understanding of Australian citizenship, one which does not exclude those who lacked certain ascriptive characteristics of race, culture, or religion. Paradoxically in this regard, Deakin, more than Howard, may have more to offer for two reasons. One is on the grounds of Deakin's firm commitment to a robust sense of political citizenship and a genuine secular democracy. The other is 'the intellectual openness and commitment to the middle ground associated with Deakinite Liberalism' (Brett 2002: 52), which makes Deakin more receptive to engage with the politics of difference.

These qualities, especially those pertaining to political citizenship and acceptance of difference, lend themselves more to the distinctive narrative of the Eureka Legend of the 1850s which

laid the ground for a vibrant Australian democracy cutting across many nationalities. The Eureka Legend may well provide a powerful symbol for constructing a national story which is salient and sensitive to the new pluralism of Australian society Macgregor et al (2004). For after all in the Eureka revolt the Diggers were led by Peter Lalor, an Irishman, and one of their main spokesmen was Carboni, an Italian, and a 'foreigner'. No wonder that Mark Twain visiting Australia made the perceptive observation that, the Eureka Legend remains one of the 'finest things in Australian history'.[20]

## Conclusion

An overriding theme of this chapter has been that the dynamics of the Australian-Asian connection are deeply grounded in the Australian dilemma—the celebrated tension between' history and geography'. It is a tension that runs right through how we conceive the Australian political community. As we have endeavoured to show –be they questions of national security, trade relations, or foreign policy—they are all constrained by the Australian dilemma reflecting the questions of what it means to be an Australian. A focus on identity has been largely fuelled by 'a shift in the way we perceive Australia's position in the Asian region' (Dixon 1999: 75). As argued, identity in the sense of what it means to 'being an Australian', pertains above all, to questions of equal citizenship and membership of the political community or what Smith (2001) has aptly termed the 'politics of people building'.

Hence, the future directions of the Australian-Asian relationship rest on how we set about the task of creating a sense of Australian nationhood and citizenship in a diverse and plural society. This, as argued, underscores the centrality of immigration policy—particularly settlement—in unravelling the tensions between history and geography, or stated differently, of how to cope with Australia's proximity to Asia in dealing with this perplexing question. This is not a question of the 'Asianization' of the country; rather, it is one that rests in coming to grips with social and cultural diversity with the framework of a normative multiculturalism, as a constitutive principle of the nation.

The institutional response we make to being a 'multicultural nation' holds the key to this problematic. For example, the commanding heights of the society—be they in politics, business, the professions, or even academia—show little signs of being responsive to the new pluralism in Australian society As argued in Chapter 4 this requires that we reframe the multicultural discourse within the parameters of the *political*, and *not* the cultural nation. A new statutory Charter of Multiculturalism (Jayasuriya 2008) based on a notion of 'differentiated citizenship' and a culture of social and political rights and duties, may indeed herald a new course for the languishing multicultural discourse.

Finally, it begins to become more apparent and compelling to recognise that Australia-has to make a more constructive and creative response than in the past in fashioning our 'Asian centeredness'. This is not just confined to the realm of politics and economics but more centrally focussed in getting out of being in a cultural cocoon, and able to engage meaningfully with the many cultural traditions in Asia. In this regard, we need to be reminded of the prophetic words of Alfred Deakin's reflections over a hundred years ago, following his visit to India, Deakin observed wisely in 1893 that, despite marked differences, politically and individually, that the geographical Asia and Australia brings 'them face to face . . . hand to hand, and mind to mind [and] . . . have much to teach each other' (Deakin 1893: 151).

Adapting Kipling's, famous remark 'What should they know of England who only England know?' Deakin in concluding his epic study, *Temple and the Tomb* wisely reflects:

> what can we know of Australia if we limit our inquires within our borders, to the neglect of our relations far and near, and of those Asiatic empires which lie closest to us, with whose future our own tropical lands may yet be partially identified? A people of yesterday, sprung from a Western race, we find ourselves settled under the shadow of the antique Orient, and its swarming myriads of coloured peoples. Some are already adjoining our northern coasts; the distance which separates us from those upon the mainland is being steadily diminished year by year (Deakin 1893: 151).

While commending these prophetic insights to the current Australian political leadership, we might add a footnote to Deakin from Bruce Grant (1983), a former Australian Ambassador to India in his prophetic remark that '*Asia remains the most likely catalyst of an Australian civilization*'.

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## Endnotes

[1] An alternative perspective on the Australian-Asian connection will be found in the recent work of the cultural theorists, e.g., Gilbert, Khoo and Lo 2003; D'Cruz and  Steele 2003, and others who focus on 'Asia in Australia'. For a well-documented account of 'Australia in Asia', i.e., how Australia is perceived in the region, see also Bronowski 2003.

[2] In this context, see Roger Smith's (2001) notion of stories of peoplehood as a heuristic framework to explore some of the perennial dilemmas of Australian democracy and citizenship. According to Smith the politics of people building defines the basis on which the membership of the political community is to be determined.

[3] Collins (1985) points out that for Hartz this was a 'radical fragment' in which a radical democracy overthrows an 'early whiggery and proceeds to define 'the national spirit in a bold but triumphant socialism' (165).

[4] The term 'Anxious Nation'; originating from David Walker's (1999) path finding study of Australian Asian relations 1850-1936, captures the essence of the Australian dilemma.

[5] For an account of the life of Pearson, see Treganza 1968; see also Walker 1999.

[6] From the late 19th century Australian nationalism was associated with the Australian Natives Association (ANA) established in Melbourne in 1871. The motto of the ANA was 'Advance Australia', and membership was restricted to 'native Australians, i.e., colonial born Australians.

[6] As Carter (1998) points out, 'civic identity means that the nation state requires citizens to work with its legal, social, and political institutions' (23-4). But, with Deakin, this of course sits somewhat uneasily alongside the dominate theme of an 'ethno-nationalism', privileging Britishness.

[7] For details of Deakin's interest in eastern religions, see Gabbay 1992 and Roe 1986; see also Croucher 1988 and Carey 2003.

[8] Cotton (2005) refers to Australian aid policy as the 'human and soft power'

aspects of the Australian-Asian connection. These, though not examined in this paper, warrant greater scrutiny.

[9] For example, the share of exports to the UK and European countries had declined from about 58% in 1950 to about 17% in 2001, and conversely the share of imports from these countries had fallen from 60% in 1949/50 to 11% in 2001.

[10] For a detailed analysis of these changes in foreign policy, see Cotton 2005; Dalrymple 2003; Goldsworthy 2003; Cotton and Ravenhill 2002; Evans 1995.

[11] See Ingelson Report (1989), Lo Bianco Report (1987), and Evans (1995) who characterise Asia in terms of the 'East Asian Hemisphere' or 'constructive engagement with Asia'.

[12] APEC, central to Asian Engagement in the Hawke and Keating eras, is a loosely structural grouping of countries for trade and economic cooperation. APEC consisted of East Asian countries, NAFTA (i.e., US, Canada and Mexico), New Zealand and Chile.

[13] For a discussion of citizenship theorizing in the polity of a new pluralism, see Jayasuriya 2004.

[14] For an overview of multiculturalism as an ideology of settlement, see Jayasuriya 2003.

[15] For an examination of the multicultural discourse in relation to national unity and identity, see Meaney 1995.

[16] For a discussion on the Eureka Legend, see Butler 2003 and Wright 2004.

[17] Dixon (1999) who falls within the ideological left as a feminist historian adopts the Howard/Blainey conservative views on an Australians identity and explicitly refers to the need to reassert an Anglo-Celtic culture as an essential condition of solidarity and belongingness.

[18] In this context, see also the Howard's government blanket rejection of the HREOC Report, *Article 18* (HREOC 1995) on endorsing the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief.

[19] For a detailed discussion on the meaning of Eureka in Australian history, see Butler 1983 and Wright 2004.